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Abstract 
 
Giorgio Agamben has recently described the state of exception as a new ‘paradigm of 
government’ while Judith Butler writes of ‘the new war prison’ in which terror 
suspects and other ‘detainees’ face an indefinite detention suspended beyond or 
outside law. Less remarked upon has been the recent entry into Australian politics of a 
new penal form: schemes that provide for the post-sentence detention (continued 
imprisonment) of sex offenders who have completed a finite sentence of 
imprisonment and who would otherwise be returned to society as free citizens. First 
introduced in 2003 in Queensland, where such detention may be indefinite, three 
Australian states now have extended supervision and detention arrangements, while 
Victoria is currently drafting legislation to add continued detention to its current 
extended supervision provisions. This paper examines these measures that aim to 
excise, quarantine or exclude certain categories or groups of people from society 
through the lens of liberty rights. Particularly significant within the structure of 
justification for these measures, it will be suggested, is the status of justice rights. The 
focus of the paper is upon one recent case, Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v 
GTR [2008], wherein key movements occurred in an emerging jurisprudence of 
security and architecture of control. 
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Toward a new economy of suspended rights: sex offenders and 
post-sentence confinement and control 
 
 
On 14 November 2001 a sex offender by the name of Joseph Belcher was released 
from prison in New Zealand. He proceeded on to a two-year period of parole, which 
was completed successfully and by the end of the year 2003 had resumed his status as 
a free citizen of New Zealand. Yet on 22 April 2005 – almost three and a half years 
after his release into the community – Belcher was placed on a 10 year Extended 
Supervision Order under retrospective provisions of New Zealand’s recently amended 
Parole Act. Belcher’s case is part of a new politics of security and control emerging in 
slightly different but clearly recognisable forms throughout the western world. It 
forms part of a new logic and strategy that dovetails neatly with a whole series of new 
restrictions and pre-emptive risk containment measures directed at suspect characters, 
most notably including terrorists and illegal migrants, and it materialises a number of 
formerly inchoate tendencies to extend punitive practices into the realm of civil threat 
or disorder.  
 
This began in Australia when in June 2003 Queensland’s Dangerous Prisoners 
(Sexual Offenders) Act came into force. There now exists a small literature on the Act 
(see for example, Gray 2005), and the case of Fardon v Attorney General for the State 
of Queensland [2004], in which the constitutionality of Robert Fardon’s indefinite 
preventive confinement under the Act was upheld by the High Court. In 2006 both 
Western Australia and New South Wales responded, promulgating legislation that 
provided for post-sentence detention and/or extended supervision orders under the 
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Crimes (Serious Sexual Offenders) Act (NSW) 2006 and the Dangerous Sexual 
Offenders Act (WA) 2006. In 2008 Victoria is well under way to toward its own post-
sentence confinement scheme, which is likely also to be targeted toward sexual 
offenders generally. Each of these schemes provides for long periods of post-sentence 
confinement – ranging from indefinite detention in Queensland and Western Australia 
to five-year (extendable) detentions in New South Wales and the mooted Victorian 
scheme. These confinement schemes may also be buttressed by arrangements for the 
long-term supervision and monitoring of offenders in the community. New Zealand 
and Victoria both have quite draconian versions of such schemes. 
 
Analytically, one way to understand these developments is to situate them within the 
rapidly expanding field of security in the post-9/11 world. Lucia Zedner, whose work 
is concerned with the tension security invokes between different conceptions of 
rights, is one person who has done much to develop this sort of analysis (Zedner, 
2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2007, 2008). One the one hand, she suggests, there is the widely 
held assumption that the key justification and purpose of security is the protection of 
freedom, yet the means by which this often ill defined notion of freedom is achieved 
often works to undermine those very liberty rights that constitute political freedom. 
She cites Michael Ignatieff’s observation that, in this respect, such undermining 
reflects what he terms a ‘moral temptation’ in our society to see liberty itself as 
divisible, such that the liberty of some may be secured by extinguishing or 
significantly constraining the liberty rights of others (Zedner, 2005: 524). Part of what 
makes such a strategy so tempting is that the costs of public safety achieved in this 
way tend to fall on just a small minority who are felt to be, as it were, dispensable, not 
only in the utilitarian sense of their small number but also through their being what 
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Nils Christie and Loic Waquant have termed in the penal context ‘suitable enemies’ 
(Christie, 1986; Waquant, 1999). The danger associated with this sort of approach to 
securing social goods forms a conceptual thread that runs throughout Zedner’s work. 
It is not intended here to reprise her arguments in detail, but rather to draw out a few 
key observations that will provide a springboard into the present paper, the aim of 
which is to consider the emerging form of one apparatus of security in Australia.  
 
Four observations will help set the scene. First, despite its frequently paradoxical (or 
incoherent) effects, and despite the many difficulties with the notion of ‘balance’ that 
is used in its justification, the recruitment of security measures is ultimately tied to the 
desire to preserve liberty and freedom (Zedner, 2003a, 2005). The observed failure of 
security measures to do so, or their inherent tendency to trample the very goods they 
are supposed to uphold (Zedner, 2008), suggests therefore that it is quite possible to 
have too much security, but this still leaves unanswered the question of how security 
might best be measured out. Second, the failure of security mechanisms, and indeed 
of the demand for them, to self-regulate naturally means we should look for 
analogous situations that would supply principles for the justification and distribution 
of security. Zedner argues in favour of ‘harvesting … analogous principles’ (2003a: 
176) from criminal justice, where experience with the high-stakes associated with 
punishment would provide an approach to security that offers appropriate protections 
to individual rights. Thus, a principled approach based upon the procedural and 
structural safeguards common to criminal justice is suggested by Zedner as an 
appropriate corrective to rhetorical or politically flimsy arguments about the 
appropriate balancing of individual liberty rights with public safety. Third, as noted 
previously, special attention is needed to the way in which risk assessment and threat 
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profiling has created new classes of dangerous individuals whose behaviour is 
rendered, at least notionally, scientifically predictable. It is precisely this rational 
scientific measurement of risk, argues Zedner, that ‘that furnishes the ostensible moral 
basis for designating dangerous populations whose rights to due process are 
overridden solely because they belong to a particular group’ (2008: 25). Finally, it 
must be recognised that the discussion of liberty rights is always twofold: liberty 
involves both a freedom to act (typically termed positive liberty) and a freedom from 
governmental restriction (negative liberty). When security is discussed as a balance 
between individual rights and public safety, the individual rights in question tend to 
be presumed to be positive rights (eg., the right of prisoners to go free upon expiry of 
their sentence) and the role of state power is elided by the discussion of ‘community’ 
safety. Yet, the nub of the issue, as Zedner rightly I think argues, is the question of 
‘[h]ow to enhance security’ against a pressing threat ‘without diminishing security 
against the state’: how to achieve that, she suggests, ‘is a central problem of our 
times.’ (2005: 532, emphasis added). 
 
In a recent attempt to develop a critical criminology of offender risk (this author, 
2008) I suggested that Hannah Arendt’s work on the Jewish experience in Nazi 
Germany had clear relevance. Arendt argued that the Jews came to be constructed as 
‘superfluous people’ not by chance or happenstance but by the application of distinct 
processes and political techniques. These included constructing the ‘Jewish problem’ 
as one that may be solved by a utilitarian logic of greater goods; of priming the wider 
population through strategies of psychological inoculation, such as through 
techniques of gradualism, denatured language and belief in special categories of 
persons; and finally through the killing of the juridical subject, the bearer of rights. 
  
7 
7 
Here Arendt concluded: ‘Jurists are so used to thinking in terms of punishment, which 
indeed always deprives us of certain rights, that they may find it even more difficult 
than the layman to recognise that the deprivation of legality, i.e., of all rights, no 
longer has a connection with specific crimes.’ (1951: 374).  
 
The remainder of this paper will consider the way jurists have negotiated this difficult 
nexus, one that lies also at the heart of Australian sex offender supervision and 
detention schemes. This is the effacement of the historical and presumptive link 
between specific crimes and the regime of suspended rights that we normally 
associate with sentences of imprisonment. Over time, juridical responses to the 
problem of imprisonment – its moral and ethical challenges – lead to the development 
of the elaborate structure of principles that Zedner refers to and that we commonly 
understand as general principles of justice. Our concern here, therefore, will be with 
the response of Australian jurists to the problem of imprisonment when it is framed 
within the new discourse not of punishment but of security. As such, it will be 
worthwhile beginning this analysis with a sense of how those seeking the passage of 
such bills – Australian parliamentarians – have represented the sex offenders with 
whom they are concerned.  
 
Quarantining Sex Offender Risk 
 
All Australian legislation follows with minor variation the model of Queensland’s 
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003. In each state, the legislation has 
met with little by way of sustained attention within Parliament. In the New South 
Wales Legislative Council, for example, where after very brief debate the Crimes 
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(Serious Sex Offenders) Bill was passed by a 19-5 vote margin, one member sought to 
extend the then Premier’s description of criminals as ‘grubs’ by claiming he did ‘not 
want to refer to these characters as persons, people or human beings’ and that ‘the use 
of the term “people” is too kind’ (Hansard NSW, 2006: 21812). Against the claim of 
liberty rights, another member chastised those in the house ‘who appear to have an 
unnatural and bizarre need to set themselves up as the guardians of sex offenders’ (p. 
21805). In the Victorian Parliament the question of rights was situated within a 
framework of ‘exceptional’ behaviour which would in turn produce exceptional risks 
and thus exceptional obligations upon the Parliament. ‘Extraordinary crimes’ argued 
one member ‘must be subject to extraordinary measures’ (Hansard Vic, 2005: 21), 
while the minister introducing the bill reminded members that the community had ‘a 
special obligation to our children … and it warrants whatever it is that might be 
adversely impacted upon in relation to the supposed rights of offenders’ (p. 36, my 
emphasis).  
 
Clearly this is not an encouraging start and it rather undermines claims by a number 
of jurists in the cases cited below to be giving effect to their parliament’s carefully 
considered intentions in respect of the framing of certain sections. Nevertheless, if 
Lucia Zedner’s (2003a) suggestion that the limiting principles of punishment (eg., of 
proportionality, parsimony, restraint, or equal impact) might be useful also for 
delimiting mechanisms of security, then we might expect Australia’s higher courts of 
appeal to be the place where the first moves towards such a jurisprudence of security 
might emerge. The case on which I concentrate here is Director of Public 
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR, a matter heard on appeal in the Western Australia Supreme 
Court between June and September 2008 that was significant for its breadth of 
  
9 
9 
attention to some of they key interpretive questions arising in the WA statute. 
However, since the drafting of legislative provisions around the country is nearly 
identical, the Court in GTR also drew upon and discussed a number of other cases of 
appellate review of sex offender legislation in Western Australia, Queensland, NSW 
and Victoria, thus providing an Australia-wide relevance. I wish to draw out three 
points from GTR, but to expand here on just the first. These are: (i) the interpretation 
of the Court as to the evidence necessary in order for a continued supervision or 
detention order to be made; (ii) the possibility of making no order should the 
government be unwilling or unable to make good the preventive (treatment/proper 
supervision) element of the order; and (iii) its decision on the admissibility of 
evidence of offending as a child. Together, these three factors reveal a court shifting 
back and forth between criminal and civil standards and precepts in order to establish 
an entirely new field of legality that makes possible the governmental objectives of 
quarantine and exclusion. 
 
Establishing risk to community 
 
The Western Australian legislation sets out in s 40 that proceedings under the Act ‘are 
to be taken to be criminal proceedings for all purposes’. Further, individuals detained 
under the Act will be treated as prisoners, being detained ‘in a prison under the 
Prisons Act 1981’ (s 45). One might expect therefore, given the criminal nature of 
proceedings and the effective imprisonment under consideration, that a criminal 
standard of proof would be required in order to secure post-sentence detention or 
supervision of an offender against predicted future conduct. In fact, in line with other 
state’s schemes, the WA law establishes a complex set of intersections between 
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standards of proof, estimates of likelihood and vague invocations of seriousness of 
imagined future conduct. Just how these are worked out, and in whose benefit 
presumptions and similar legal devices are established, will go a long way in 
determining the capacity of Australian jurists to take seriously the importance of 
individual liberty rights for ‘suspect’ populations. 
 
Section 7 of the WA Act establishes that the court must ‘be satisfied that there is an 
unacceptable risk that, if the person were not subject to a continuing detention order 
or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence’ and that 
this satisfaction must be ‘to a high degree of probability’. The WA court had 
previously considered this in Williams [2007], while the ‘high degree of probability’ 
element had been considered in Victoria in TSL [2006] and in NSW in Tillman [2007] 
and Cornwall [2007], both of the latter following TSL. The court in TSL prefaced its 
conclusions by noting that ‘[a] person subject to an extended supervision order is a 
prisoner in all but name’ (at 10). Nevertheless, it concluded in respect of the ‘high 
degree of probability’ question that ‘[t]here is no reason to think that it must be more 
than 50%.’ (at 11), meaning that while the court must be satisfied that a further 
serious offence is likely, it should not be required to be more likely than not. The 
Court in GTR followed this lead, denying that the legislation (and legislative intent) 
could be construed to mean that, overall, there must be a better than even chance (> 
50%) that a serious sexual offence would occur if an order were not made. The 
language used is that the legislation conveys ‘no requirement’ for such a high 
standard (at 34). Thus despite the clearly criminal context and outcomes, a civil 
standard comes to applied as a strategic tool in conditions where no serious hope 
could be found for success under any measure of criminal (justice) standards. 
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Setting out the cascading decision structure in the WA legislation, the Court in GTR 
noted (at 34) that for an order to be made there must be (i) satisfaction to a high 
degree of probability; that (ii) there was an ‘unacceptable risk’; that (iii) a serious 
sexual offence ‘would’ occur unless a continuing detention or supervision order were 
made. We are thus left with a proportion (the high degree of probability), of a further 
proportion (the risk), of an event (the offence), which is itself conditioned by the 
impact of another event (treatment to be received in detention or on community 
supervision). Within this, offenders’ liberty rights are considered as part of a 
‘balancing exercise’ (at 27). This, essentially, forms the mechanism by way of which 
such rights are traded away against the impacts of offenders’ imagined future 
behaviour, the result going to form the ‘unacceptable risk’ component above. What 
we find in the emerging jurisprudence of risk, therefore, is an eschewal of the very 
principles justice that lie at the heart of traditional criminal judgment and an 
acceptance of a new hybrid domain of exception, neither fully criminal nor fully civil 
but construed and constructed so as to give effect to parliamentary intentions for the 
sub-men who are regarded as barely human. 
 
Further derogations of justice 
 
The fundamentally punitive character of continued detention and supervision in 
Western Australia emerges further when the Court considers the question of whether 
or not, upon a finding of danger by the process above, a court may decline to make an 
order. In the Queensland case of Francis [2007] the court there used the phrase 
‘executive repudiation of the preventive objects of the Act’ to describe government 
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refusal to provide treatment to a willing offender, thus making continued detention 
‘truly punitive in character’ (at 31; emphasis added). Leaving aside the very high bar 
of ‘refusal’ to provide treatment, as opposed, for instance, to provision of insufficient 
or ineffective treatment or supervision, we face here the question of whether a 
government is bound to effect prevention (through treatment, supervision conditions, 
etc) or whether danger in and of itself must trigger control (via detention of 
supervision). In GTR the Court found in favour of the latter (at 51), giving enormous 
license to government to establish minimal, ineffective or even sham measures for the 
very treatment component that is held to render detention and supervision non-
punitive and thus outside or beyond established principles for the limitation of 
punishment. This would also seem to leave ample scope for poor community 
supervisions structures to increase the likelihood that courts will be forced toward 
detention as the only reasonable option for securing public safety. 
 
The extinguishment of long held principles of justice continued in the case of GTR 
when the Court ruled on the admissibility of childhood offending. Despite this not 
being a matter of appeal, the Court felt it important to clarify that the Act’s demand 
for all material relevant to establishing a risk of further serious sexual offending 
should over ride provisions of the Young Offenders Act (WA) 1994 that effectively 
expunge youthful convictions after a period of two years. That Act’s instruction in s 
189(2) that, once two years have passed, ‘the conviction is not to be regarded as a 
conviction for any purpose’ was set off in GTR against the Dangerous Sexual 
Offenders Act counter claim in s 38(4) that information to establish risk should be 
supplied ‘despite any other law or duty of confidentiality’. Consistent with the 
demeaned status of offenders subject to these proceedings, the Court in GTR ruled 
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that the conflict should be settled in favour of the control legislation. This 
presumptive shift was not the first of its type in the judgment, but was illustrative of 
this movement back and forward to achieve governmental ends and to head off 
criminal standards and notions of justice. Earlier, for instance, the Court had give 
quick dispatch (at 29) to the Act’s instruction that its proceeding were ‘to be taken to 
be criminal proceedings for all purposes’, citing again Parliament’s intentions and the 
need to secure these ends. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has considered the treatment of individual liberty rights within an 
emerging apparatus of security. It has focused on Australian higher courts as a site for 
the invocation or refusal of principles of justice and has begun tracing the first moves 
in an emerging jurisprudence of security in respect of sex offender risk and 
community safety. The focus of this paper has been the case of Director of Public 
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] wherein a number of these issues were aired. What 
have not been mentioned thus far have been the specific details of the case. It seems 
appropriate to finish this discussion with mention of these circumstances, for they 
place in context the scope and impact of this new form of preventive control in 
Australia. The respondent, GTR, was a young Aboriginal man from a remote 
community. In prefacing his judgement on the original application for supervision, 
Director of Public Prosecutions v GTR [2007], McKechnie J remarked that of 15 
applications thus far made by the Director of Public Prosecutions, seven had 
concerned Indigenous respondents. Thus, he noted, though Aboriginal people made 
up just 3% of the WA population, they had thus far been represented in 47% of 
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Dangerous Sex Offender applications. Further, fully 33% of applications had been 
made in respect of residents of remote communities. The nature of GTR’s offending 
is also important. Without diminishing the significance of any offending, it must be 
noted that his comprised just two events, the first of which, committed as a 17 year 
old, resulted in seven months imprisonment; the second, occurring approximately one 
year following his release was met with a sentence of three years, four months. Both 
offences were against adult women. He had undertaken treatment on his most recent 
sentence and it had been considered successful. McKechnie J, in the original 
judgement decided that although there was ‘a pattern to his past offending’ there was 
‘no evidence of a propensity to so offend’ (at 132), a view supported by the appellate 
court. The danger with schemes such as these, particularly when constructed and 
interpreted in the manner described here, is that they open up what Robert Castel 
(1991: 289) has termed ‘a vast hygienist utopia’ in which the play of community 
anxieties quickly subsumes any supposed liberty rights of offenders and in which 
arguably ‘run of the mill’ offenders, such as GTR, may find themselves redefined as a 
chronic social threat. Thankfully in this case, and despite two applications from the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, the Western Australia Supreme Court declined to 
agree. 
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